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Abstract
Architectural enhancements are a set of modifications in a general-purpose
processor to improve the processing of a given workload such as multime-
dia applications and cryptographic operations. Employing faster/enhanced
arithmetic units for the existing instruction set architecture (ISA), intro-
ducing application-specific instructions to the ISA, and adding a new set of
registers are common practices employed as architectural enhancements.
In this thesis, we introduce and implement a set of relatively low-cost en-
hancement techniques to accelerate certain arithmetic operations common in
cryptographic applications on a configurable and extensible embedded pro-
cessor core. The proposed enhancements are generic in the sense that they
can profitably be applied in many RISC processors. These enhancements
are organized into, what we prefer to call as, cryptographic unit (CU) that
offers an extended ISA to the programmer. We then present the speedup val-
ues obtained for various arithmetic operations and public key cryptography
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algorithms through these enhancements. Furthermore, hardware overhead
of introducing the enhancements to the embedded extensible processor is
provided in terms of chip area. Our experimental results show that the pro-
posed architectural enhancements provides significant amount of speedup (up
to one order of magnitude) in elliptic curve cryptography and RSA with a
conservative increase in hardware. Last but not the least, we demonstrate
that the proposed enhancements facilitate protection of cryptographic algo-
rithms against certain side-channel attacks by reporting our case study of
AES implementation hardened against cache-based attacks.
iii
KRİPTOGRAFİK UYGULAMALAR İÇİN
GÖMÜLÜ İŞLEMCİ TASARIMI VE UYGULAMASI
Övünç KOCABAŞ
CS, Master Tezi, 2008
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Erkay Savaş
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Özet
Mimari iyileştirmeler, genel amaçlı işlemcilerin çoğul ortam uygulaması ve
kritografik işlemler gibi işyüklerindeki performansını arttırmak icin yapılan
değişikliklerdir. Varolan komut kümesi mimarisi için yeni ve geliştirilmiş arit-
metik birimler kullanmak, komut kümesi mimarisine yeni uygulamaya özgü
işlemler tanıtmak ve yeni yazmaç kümesi eklemek genel olarak kullanılan
mimari iyileştirme teknikleridir.
Bu tezde, kriptografik uygulamalarda kullanılan aritmetik işlemleri hız-
landırmak amacıyla nispeten düşük maliyetli iyileştirme teknikleri önerilmiş
ve bu tekniklerin uygulaması yapılmıştır. İyileştirme teknikleri çoğu RISC
işlemcisine uygulanabilecek şekilde tasarlanmıştır. Bu iyileştirmeler Krip-
tografik Birim olarak organize edilmiş ve programcıya genişletilmiş komut
kümesi mimarisi olarak sunulmuştur. Öngörülen iyileştirmeler kullanıldığında
çeşitli aritmetik işlemler ve açık anahtarlı şifreleme algoritmaları için hı-
zlanma değerleri sunulmuştur. Ayrıca, genişletilebilir gömülü mimariler için
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önerilen iyileştirmelerin uygulanması sonucunda oluşan donanım gideri yonga
alanı olarak gösterilmiştir. Yapılan deneyler sonucunda önerilen iyileştirmeler
sayesinde eliptik eğri şifreleme ve RSA sistemlerinde makul bir donanım artışı
karşılığında önemli seviye de hızlanma kaydedilmiştir. Son olarak önerilen iy-
ileştirmelerin aynı zamanda kriptograpfik algoritmaların bazı yan kanal atak-
larına karşı korunmasında yardımcı olacağı gösterilmiştir.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
When embedded microprocessors made their first presence a few decades
ago, they were merely low-end micro-controllers designed to perform only
simple control instructions [9]. Ever since with the escalating innovations in
integrated circuit technology, the role of embedded microprocessors is also
revolutionized. Nowadays embedded microprocessors are used in almost ev-
ery aspects of daily life, ranging from portable devices to large stationary
installations. Furthermore, complexity of these processors rises up from sin-
gle low-end micro-controller unit to multiple units integrated into one board
with peripherals and network connection.
ARM, MIPS and Power PC are some of the examples of the most widespread
embedded microprocessor architectures which were developed in the 1980’s
for stand-alone microprocessor chips. These architectures are excelled in per-
forming wide range of algorithms. However with the emergence of innovative
research areas and their applications fields, such as multimedia and com-
munication applications, more processing power is demanded by designers.
Public key cryptosystems, which employ multi-precision arithmetic, also re-
quire more processing power since overwhelming majority of their running
time is spent in a few performance-critical sections. A common solution for
the related performance problem is two-fold: either designers move on to a
processor which has a higher clock frequency or they can design custom hard-
ware for boosting up the performance of the critical portions of their design.
Former is the most straightforward yet old-fashioned method, where the in-
creasing clock frequency triggers excessive power consumption which turns
out to be yet another problem for the designers. In the latter method, design-
ers build custom hardware blocks by using hardware description languages
(e.g. VHDL and Verilog) to speed-up the hot spots of their applications.
This method is extensively used for reaching high frequency values which
embedded microprocessors fail to respond. However, most of the time de-
signing a custom RTL hardware consumes significant amount of time and
effort. Verifying the RTL hardware takes even more time and once designed,
these hardware blocks cannot be changed easily. Due to these issues, RTL
hardware design for performance enhancement may become complicated task
for the designers.
A novel solution for boosting up performance is to use configurable pro-
cessors instead of embedded microprocessors and RTL hardware blocks for
specific applications that demand high performance. These processors are
a new family of processor cores, in which one can modify a processor for a
specific application. These cores are much faster, more efficient and able to
perform more than standard embedded microprocessors.
This work explores the benefits of architectural enhancements for fast and
secure computation of cryptographic operations on a configurable processor.
The enhancements come in three flavors: 1) configuring processor core, 2) ex-
tending architecture with new functional units with reasonable overhead and
3) augmenting the existing ISA with new instructions. The performance of
public key cryptography is primarily determined by the efficient implementa-
tion of arithmetic operations in the underlying algebraic structure (e.g. finite
field). Extending a general purpose processor through relatively low-cost en-
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hancement techniques for fast arithmetic operations, which dominate cryp-
tographic computations in terms of time and resource usage, has a number of
benefits over using hardware accelerator such as a cryptographic co-processor
which is in the category of RTL design. First, performing the cryptographic
operations within processor core eliminates the communication overhead and
possibly associated security risks, accrued in processor/co-processor settings.
Second, the area of a cryptographic co-processor is generally much larger than
the area overhead of proposed enhancements that are tightly coupled to the
processor core and directly exploited by the instruction stream. Third, ar-
chitectural enhancements offer a degree of flexibility and scalability that goes
far beyond of fixed-function hardware such as a co-processor since extended
architecture still be used for general-purpose computing with the potential
benefit for other application domains as well.
1.2 Background Information
In this section we elaborate on two public key cryptography schemes e.g.
RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography which are implemented on enhanced
processor.
1.2.1 Public Key Cryptography
Public Key Cryptography, which is also named as asymmetric cryptography,
is proposed as a solution to distribution and management of secret keys. In a
network environment with n users, n(n− 1)/2 keys should be generated and
distributed and implementing this structure without using a secure channel
is a difficult problem. The first solution to the problem was introduced by
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Diffie and Hellman [8] in 1976.
In public key cryptography, every user has a pair of keys: public key
and private (secret) key. The private key is only known to user while public
key can be distributed to the network. A generic public key cryptography
protocol between two users, Alice and Bob, is as follows. First Bob sends his
public key to Alice. Alice encrypts her message by using Bob’s public key
and sends encrypted message to Bob. Bob decrypts the encrypted message
by using his private key. In this protocol, only Bob can decrypt the message
since only he knows the secret key. Both public and private key is related to
each other mathematically but by knowing public key, private key cannot be
derived in practical computation limits.
1.2.2 RSA
RSA is the most widely known and used public key cryptography algorithm.
It is invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978 [25]. In RSA, each
user has private and public key pair. The private key of the user in RSA
system is consists of two large primes, p and q, and a secret exponent d. The
public key of the user is n = p · q and e with the properties
e = d−1 mod Φ(n)
gcd(e,Φ(n)) = 1
where Φ(n) is Euler’s Totient Function and Φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q − 1).
In a RSA setting, sender encrypts the messagem by using receiver’s public
key e and sends the encrypted message c = me mod n to the receiver. To
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decrypt the encrypted message, receiver uses his private key and compute
the following
m = cd = me·d = m1+kΦ(n) = m mod n
Decryption can be performed as shown above according to Fermat’s Little
Theorem. Fermat’s Little Theorem states that an integer a and prime number
p has the relationship of
ap−1 = 1 mod p
Fermat’s Little Theorem can be generalized as Euler’s Totient Function as
follows
aΦ(p) = 1 mod p
where a and p are relatively prime to each other.
The most important operation in RSA is the modular exponentiation
operation. But the numbers used in RSA are big integers, for a minimum level
of security 1024-bit secret keys must be used, therefore it will take long time
to perform modular exponentiation if it is performed as successive modular
multiplications. Instead Binary Exponentiation Algorithm (c.f. Algorithm
1) is used to speedup the modular exponentiation.
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Algorithm 1 Binary Exponentiation Algorithm
Input: m is the base, e is k-bit exponent in binary form (ek−1, ek−2, .....e1, e0)
Output: product = me
1. product = 1
2. for i = k − 1 to i = 0
3. product = product× product
4. if (ei = 1)then product = product×m
5. return product
1.2.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Neal Koblitz [17] and Victor Miller [21] independently proposed new stan-
dards for public key cryptography which is called as Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy(ECC). They showed that a group defined on an elliptic curve can be
used for cryptographic operations. For cryptographic applications, elliptic
curves defined on prime field GF(p) or binary extension field GF(2n) can be
chosen.
An elliptic curve over GF(p) is defined as the set of solutions to the
following equation
y2 = x3 + a · x+ b
where a and b are elements in prime finite field. If a point (x, y) satisfies the
above equation then it is on the elliptic curve. All points satisfy the equation
above and the infinity point, which is denoted as θ, over prime finite field,
form an additive group and point addition operation is the group operation.
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The point addition of two points, P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2), on the
elliptic curve is as follows
R = P +Q = (x3, y3)
λ =
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 mod p
x3 = λ
2 − (x1 + x2) mod p
y3 = (λ · (x1 − x3)− y1) mod p
where λ is the slope of the line, passing through points P and Q. The point
addition operation is presented in Figure 1.
y
+ ax + b
R = (P+Q)
x
Q
P
Figure 1: Point Addition Operation on elliptic curves
Another version of point addition is point doubling where S = 2P is
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computed as follows (c.f Figure 2).
S = 2P = (x3, y3)
λ =
3 · x21 + a
2 · y1 mod p
x3 = λ
2 − (2 · x1) mod p
y3 = (λ · (x1 − x3)− y1) mod p
y
x
S = 2P
P
Figure 2: Point Doubling Operation on elliptic curves
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The modular exponentiation operation of RSA is equivalent to point mul-
tiplication operation in ECC. In point multiplication, a point on the elliptic
curve is multiplied with a scalar and the result of the multiplication resides
again on the elliptic curve. Point multiplication operation is performed as
repeated point addition and point doubling. The advantage of the ECC over
RSA is that in ECC same security level of RSA can be achieved by using
shorter key lengths. For instance, 1024-bit RSA security level is equivalent
to 160-bit key length in ECC. This property makes ECC a promising PKC
since the encryption operation can be performed faster than the RSA and
shorter key lengths and digital signatures are required to RSA with the same
level of security.
1.3 Previous Works and Motivation
Previous works [12, 13, 30, 31, 11] propose various enhancements to accel-
erate cryptographic operations. For instance, the authors in [12] propose
five custom instructions to accelerate arithmetic operations in both GF (p)
and GF (2n) on MIPS32 core to benefit elliptic curve cryptography while ISA
extensions in [31] aim to accelerate pairing-based cryptography. Similarly,
the authors in [11] explore the effects of on-chip memory on the execution
time of s-box computations in symmetric key cryptography. A common fea-
ture of these works is that they focus on custom solutions for accelerating an
individual cryptographic operation on general-purpose processors.
In this work, we take a slightly different and holistic approach by designing
and integrating so called Cryptographic Unit (CU) into a configurable and
extensible processor core. Numerous cryptographic operations will benefit
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from CU for fast and secure execution. The proposed CU facilitates new and
powerful instructions and hardware extensions to accelerate multiplication
and inversion in prime finite field GF (p) and cryptographic operations which
are performed in RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. It is also shown that
CU is instrumental for software implementation of AES which is resistant to
side-channel attacks.
1.4 Contribution
In public key cryptography, the most important operations are finite field
arithmetic operations. In Diffie-Hellman key exchange [8], RSA [25] and dig-
ital signature systems [23] modular exponentiation is the most important and
time consuming operation which is performed as repeated modular multipli-
cations. Also for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), point multiplication
operation is the most expensive operation in terms of time and area. Point
multiplication operation is performed as point doubling and point addition
operations. These operations consist of modular inversions, modular multi-
plications and modular additions. Thus overall performance of public key
cryptosystems is determined by the performance of arithmetic operations in
finite fields.
In this thesis, we proposed a Cryptographic Unit (CU) for fast and secure
execution of the arithmetic operations in finite fields. The proposed CU is
generic thus it can be integrated into many RISC based processors. Within
the CU a cryptographic register file and a cryptographic execution unit are
introduced. Besides, new instructions are defined to employ the units in the
CU.
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An enhanced processor is designed by integrating the CU on a config-
urable and extensible processor core. Arithmetic operations are implemented
on the enhanced processor and the speedup values are up to 13.1 times for
modular multiplication and 4.6 times for modular inversion. Both RSA and
ECC operations are implemented on the enhanced processor as well and a
performance improvement of 10.1 times for RSA and 8.08 times for ECC are
obtained.
The enhanced processor is later mapped to a specific FPGA board (Avnet
LX200) and hardware cost and clock frequency of the processor are obtained.
The clock frequency of the processor demonstrates that the CU does not
increase the critical path delay while introducing additional hardware to
processor core. By using the implementation results, time× area product is
computed for both RSA and ECC to investigate if the speedups are profitable.
The time× area product shows that by employing the CU an improvement
up to 6.64 times in RSA and 4.69 times in ECC can be achieved. The results
prove that the benefits of the proposed CU far exceed its cost.
Finally, it is shown that using the CU can be instrumental for protecting
software implementation of AES from certain side channel attacks (cache-
based attacks) with a reasonable overhead in execution time.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
The outline of the rest of thesis is as follows:
• Chapter 2 reveals the detailed architecture of custom processor de-
signed for cryptographic applications. It starts with the designing
process of the custom processor on configurable and extensible base
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processor. Architectural enhancements and new set of instructions are
introduced later. Finally hardware cost of implementing custom pro-
cessor is provided in number of gates in 0.13µm technology.
• Chapter 3 explains Montgomery’s method for modular multiplication.
It discusses methods for implementing Montgomery Multiplication on
hardware. Modified version of one of the discussed methods is pre-
sented which utilizes the enhanced architecture of custom processor.
The chapter ends with the comparison of modified method for custom
processor with the most efficient method for implementation on base
processor.
• Chapter 4 starts with the definition of modular inversion operation in
GF (p) finite fields. It introduces two efficient algorithms for computing
modular inverse in hardware. The chapter ends with the comparison of
both algorithm’s performance on custom processor and base processor.
• Chapter 5 shows the impact of the proposed enhancements presented in
Chapter 3 on RSA and elliptic curve cryptography. The speedups for
RSA and elliptic curve cryptography are presented. Implementation
of the enhanced processor on specific FPGA board is explained and
finally time × area products of RSA and elliptic curve cryptography
on custom processor and base processor are compared.
• Chapter 6 moves to symmetric key cryptography with the focus on
AES. A side channel attack e.g. cache based attack, against software
implementation of AES is introduced. Counter measures to protect
12
software implementation of AES are discussed. Finally the overhead of
protection mechanisms are presented in terms of execution time.
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and discusses on future work possibili-
ties.
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2 General Architecture
2.1 Configurable Processors
A typical configurable processor consists of a pre-defined processor core which
can be enhanced for specific application requirements. Configuring these pro-
cessor cores generally includes modifications, additions or removals to pro-
cessor peripherals, memories, external bus widths and handshake protocols.
One can add as many functional units as possible for performance improve-
ment and still keep the area small by removing the unnecessary parts for the
specific application. Once finished with the configuration, configurable pro-
cessors are synthesized as RTL code and can be mapped to ASIC or FPGA’s.
ARC [3], Improv [14], Tensilica [27] are some of the major companies that
offer configurable processor cores.
Tensilica’s Xtensa configurable processor cores are preferred as the target
embedded processor in our work, since they are one of the configurable cores
that offer full software-development tool chain, including compiler, debugger
and ISS (Instruction Set Simulator) to match the configured processor. In
addition, the Tensilica Xtensa cores are also extensible; a property that make
them a superset of configurable processors, offering more flexible solutions
compared to the other configurable-only processors.
2.2 Tensilica Xtensa Processor Cores
Tensilica offers two types of Xtensa configurable cores: LX2 and Xtensa 7,
which are intended for embedded applications. While Xtensa 7 is optimized
for low power applications such as control operations, LX2 cores are more
14
flexible and ideal for high performance demanded data-incentive operations.
Among these cores we choose LX2 cores for our base processor since we
will be dealing with multi-precision arithmetic in finite fields and performing
these operations will require more processing power.
2.2.1 LX2 Cores
Xtensa’s LX2 32-bit processor architecture features a compact instruction
set optimized for embedded system designs. The base architecture includes
a 32-bit ALU, up to 64 general-purpose physical registers, 80 base instruc-
tions including 16 and 24-bit instruction encoding instead of RISC encoding
which enables significant code size reductions [29]. Furthermore LX2 core has
two essential features; namely configurability and extensibility, which will be
utilized in the process of generating custom cryptographically-enhanced pro-
cessor.
Configurability attribute of LX2 core offers designers to robust their de-
sign for the specific applications where they can modify the processor core
according to their design specs. Modification of processor can be made
by defining the width and number of execution units, data interfaces and
optional data paths. Whereas with extensibility feature, custom execution
units, registers, register files, single-instruction multiple-data functional units
can be added to processor data path. Extensions to data path is achieved
through Tensilica Instruction Extension (TIE) language. TIE is a Verilog-
like language which is used to describe instruction set extensions to processor
core. Functional behaviors of desired extensions are defined in TIE and TIE
compiler will generate and place the RTL equivalent blocks into processor
15
data path. A typical LX2 processor core is given in Figure 3 [28].
 
Figure 3: Xtensa LX2 Core
2.3 Generating Custom cryptographically-enhanced pro-
cessor
Our design criteria for generating a custom cryptographically-enhanced pro-
cessor is to build a processor which provides not only fast and secure execu-
tion of public key cryptography algorithms of RSA and elliptic curve cryptog-
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raphy but also a core that is resistant to certain side-channel attacks against
the software implementation of symmetric key cryptography algorithms, e.g.
AES.
Design process of creating such processor consists of two steps. First, LX2
processor core is configured into so called base processor and then the base
processor is extended with custom instructions and functional units by using
TIE language to build final configuration which we name as cryptographically-
enhanced processor.
Xtensa Xplorer Integrated Design Environment (IDE) is utilized dur-
ing design and implementation steps of cryptographically-enhanced processor.
Xplorer IDE tool integrates software development and processor optimiza-
tion tools into one common environment and it provides all necessary tools
for processor and TIE development, software development and modeling and
simulation.
All the applications and the public key cryptography algorithms are de-
veloped in C programming language. In the performance analysis sections
of the following chapters, arithmetic operations and public key cryptography
algorithms are compared according to their execution times in terms of clock
cycles. Clock cycle values are obtained by executing code on Xplorer IDE
and looking the profile information, which is generated by the cycle-accurate
Instruction Set Simulator (ISS) of the Xplorer IDE.
2.3.1 Base Processor
Cryptographically-enhanced processor is designed for embedded systems and
configuration of base processor is performed depending on the requirements
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of embedded systems. Therefore we aim to generate a processor as compact
as possible yet still efficient enough to perform fast execution of cryptographic
operations.
To keep processor size as small as possible, unnecessary units are removed
from LX2 core. For instance, floating point unit is removed from core since
public key operations are performed by using integer arithmetic. Also 32-
bit integer divider is removed as the division operations in cryptographic
algorithms will be performed by shifting the value to the right . Data and in-
struction caches are also chosen as reasonable sizes and direct-mapped cache.
To increase processor’s performance, memory-cache interfaces and Pro-
cessor Interface(PIF) are chosen as 128-bit (largest available) to increase
bandwidth and word size of processor. The configuration of base processor
is presented in Table 1.
Unit Configuration
Multiply Unit 32 bit
Register File 32 × 32-bit
Data memory/cache interface 128-bit
PIF interface 128-bit
Data Cache 8KB / direct-mapped / 16byte line size
Instruction Cache 8KB / direct-mapped / 16byte line size
Table 1: Configuration of base processor
Pipeline length of the LX2 core is also configurable and two versions
of base processor are generated with 5 and 7 stage pipeline length. The
hardware cost of 5 and 7 stage pipelined versions of base processor in 0.13µm
CMOS technology is as follows
• A total of approx. 119,000 gates with 5-stage pipeline configuration,
18
• A total of approx. 137,000 gates with 7-stage pipeline configuration.
2.3.2 Building cryptographically-enhanced processor
Prior to proposing architectural extensions and new instructions to base pro-
cessor, following criteria are taken into consideration and enhancements are
proposed in a way that they do not result in:
• unacceptable increase in area,
• change in instruction format and size,
• difficult integration with available tool-chain(e.g. compilers, debuggers,
linkers),
• major change in the control circuitry and existing pipeline structure
Extensions to the base processor are done by integrating a new unit referred
as cryptographic unit (CU) and introducing new set of instructions to core
ISA. Figure 4 shows the CU which consists of two parts: cryptographic reg-
ister file (CRF) and cryptographic execution unit (CEU). In the following
sections, the CRF and the CEU are explained in detail prior to introducing
new instructions.
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Figure 4: General Architecture of Enhanced Embedded Core
2.3.3 Cryptographic Register File (CRF)
The CRF is an array of 32 registers each of which has 128-bit width and
is used to store operands and temporary results of arithmetical operations.
Storing these values in the CRF will significantly reduce the execution time
since the number of time consuming memory access operations will be re-
duced. Besides, the CRF can be used to store sensitive information such
as secret keys and small look-up tables for increasing security level of cryp-
tographic algorithms. In Chapter 6, we will show that the CRF will be
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of crucial importance for protecting software implementation of AES from
side-channel attacks; e.g. cache attacks.
Furthermore, the CRF can be shared by different processes if the oper-
ating system supports multi-tasking. In order to alleviate the security and
switching cost concerns, we propose transactional usage of the CRF. The con-
tent of the CRF is not saved by the operating system on context switching;
therefore any process that wants to use CRF does not automatically assume
that the register contents remain intact forever. The process is provided with
a consistent view of the CRF for only short duration (e.g. the duration of
one multi-precision multiplication). It can lock the CRF for this duration so
that no other process can use the CRF if the context switching occurs too
frequently. The operating system can assist process for a fair schedule of the
CRF usage in order to prevent starvation or attacks by malicious processes.
A smart scheduling algorithm can easily solve the aforementioned problems.
2.3.4 Cryptographic Execution Unit (CEU)
The CEU is the new execution unit designed to utilize 128-bit width pro-
cessor interface and the CRF during cryptographic operations. By choosing
interface precision as 128-bit we simply increase our word length to 128-bit
for cryptographic operations instead of 32-bit word size of general purpose
processors. Using 32-bit ALU in the core processor will be inefficient for these
operations therefore the CEU is designed to be used as functional unit for
cryptographic operations. Functional units of the CEU will now take their
operands from the CRF instead of 32-bit physical registers of core processor.
The CEU is composed of three parts: an integer unit, a shifter circuit and
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a multiply unit. While Integer Unit (IU) is capable of adding/subtracting
and comparison of two 128-bit integers, shifter circuit performs shift oper-
ation on both directions on a 128-bit register. Final functional unit in the
CEU is multiply unit which performs 128-bit multiplication, and generates
256-bit result and stores the most and least significant 128 bit of the result on
special purpose registers HI and LO respectively. Figure 5 shows the detailed
architecture of the CU and functional units inside the CEU.
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Figure 5: Detailed Architecture of the CU
2.3.5 Integer Unit
The Integer Unit (IU) consists of two parts: 128-bit adder and 128-bit com-
parator. While realization of the comparator is done straightforward, the
adder in the IU is implemented as carry select adder. The carry select adder
which is illustrated in Figure 6 consists of three 64-bit ripple carry adders
and one multiplexer.
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Carry select adder is preferred to 128-bit ripple carry adder since uti-
lizing a 128-bit ripple carry adder will increase the critical path delay. By
implementing carry ripple adder, latency of the 128-bit addition is reduced
to 64-bit addition. Implementation of the carry select adder is performed
by splitting 128-bit operands into 2 parts: 64-bit most significant part and
64-bit least significant part. First least significant 64-bit parts are added to
each other and one bit carry is generated as a result. Meanwhile for the most
significant part, two addition is computed one with the assumption of carry
is being zero and the other with the carry is being one. The carry value
generated from the least significant part of the addition is used for selecting
the result from one of the additions performed for the most significant part.
64-bit adder 
 MUX 
64-bit adder 64-bit adder 
c_rs[127:64] c_rt[127:64] c_rs[127:64] c_rt[127:64] c_rs[63:0] c_rt[63:0] 
c_rd[127:64] c_rd[63:0] 
Cin=1 
Cout 
Cin=0 
Figure 6: 128-bit carry select adder
23
2.3.6 Multiply Unit
Multiply unit is the most crucial functional unit of the CEU for accelerating
modular multiplication operations which is excessively performed in RSA
and elliptic curve cryptography. To speed up the multiplication operation
we will utilize four parallelized 32-bit multipliers without increasing critical
path delay(CPD). However, choice of the number of multipliers is critical due
to their expensive cost in terms area and number of gates.
Performing a 128-bit multiplication requires 16 32-bit multiplications.
One can choose to instantiate 16 multipliers to calculate all 32-bit multipli-
cations in parallel and one cycle then add the partial products appropriately
to get the final result. Yet using 16 32-bit multipliers will severely increase
the processor area. Instead we prefer to implement 128-bit multiplication
by utilizing four 64-bit multiplications and add the aligned partial products
to get 256-bit result. In each 64-bit multiplication four 32-bit multiplica-
tions will be performed and we will utilize four 32-bit multipliers to execute
them parallel. By using 4 parallel multipliers instead of 16 we will still get a
significant speed up at the expense of acceptable hardware cost.
2.4 128-bit Multiplication Implementation Details
The proposed cryptographically-enhanced processor has 128-bit word size
therefore, all multiplication operations are performed on 128-bit operands.
Implementation of 128-bit multiplication will be performed as follows, first
128-bit multiplication will be divided into four 64-bit multiplications (Figure
7). Each 64-bit multiplication produces a partial product and in the end all
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partial products will be aligned and added each other to compute final prod-
uct. Final product, which is 256-bits, is stored on HI and LO special purpose
registers as presented in Figure 8. First computation of partial products in
parallel by using four multipliers will be explained and then alignment and
addition of partial products into final product will be shown as successive
iterations in Figure 8.
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2.4.1 Computing Partial Products
In a 64-bit multiplication, four 32-bit multiplications are performed and with
four multipliers in the multiply unit, these multiplications can be computed
in parallel and in first clock cycle. HI register stores the tl and th of the
results while LO register stores tint1 and tint2. Before calculating the partial
product, which is 128 bits, two more operations have to be performed. First,
the intermediate results are added (tint1 and tint2) and then the sum is aligned
and added to the value in HI register. After these operations the partial
product is calculated and stored in a 128-bit register. Figure 9 shows the
process of partial product calculation.
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Figure 9: Partial Product Computation
2.4.2 Alignment and Addition of Partial Products
Four partial products of each 64-bit multiplications namely p0, p1, p2, p3 (cf.
Figure 10) which are calculated in the previous step, are stored temporarily
in four 128-bit registers. Final product is computed after three iterations
which is composed of successive additions of partial products into HI and
LO registers. These iterations are also summarized in Figure 10.
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1st iteration: Partial products p1 and p2 are added and the result (t) is
stored temporarily in a register (In following iterations, t will be divided into
two halves, tH and tL, and each half will be used as operands of addition to
HI and LO registers). Also the carry of the addition, C1, is stored in one bit
carry register as it is used in the calculation of result on HI register in the
final iteration.
2nd iteration: In this iteration, lower half of the partial sum calculated
in first iteration, tL, is added with the p0 and result will be the lower half of
the final product and stored in the LO register. Again the carry out from
this step, C2, is stored in a carry register and is used in the final iteration.
3rd iteration: With the final step, final product is calculated and stored
in HI and LO registers. In this iteration, upper half of the partial sum of
the first iteration, tH , is concatenated with C1 and summed up with the p3.
During the addition, carry of second iteration, C2, is used as carry-in value.
Finally, result of the addition is stored in HI register.
2.5 Proposed Instructions
A new family of instructions is introduced to the processor ISA to fully em-
ploy the CEU. These instructions operate on 128-bit operands and conform
to instruction type and formats of LX2 core which uses RISC instruction en-
coding. Therefore new instructions are encoded as RISC instructions with a
slight difference. Common notations of source, target and destination regis-
ters (denoted as rs, rt and rd respectively) in RISC encoding are adjusted to
reflect changes such that functional units in the CEU uses operands stored
in the CRF. Therefore source, target and destination registers of the CRF
29
are represented as c_rs, c_rt and c_rd.
All proposed instructions are presented in Table 2. ADD_CREG and
SUB_CREG operations perform unsigned addition and subtraction respec-
tively. Both operations take their operands from c_rs and c_rt registers
and write result back to c_rd register. COMP_CREG operation compares
the values of c_rs and c_rt registers and if the value of c_rs register is
greater than c_rt register than it writes 1 to c_rd otherwise it writes 0.
SHL_CREG and SHR_CREG operations perform 1 bit shift operation. The
CRF has two read ports and only one write port therefore the value of c_rs
register can be changed while the value in c_rt register remains unchanged.
MUL_CREG operation performs 128-bit unsigned multiplication and writes
product to HI and LO special purpose registers. Finally, LOAD_CREG
and STORE_CREG operations perform data transfer operations between
memory and the CRF for given memory address.
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Format Description Operation
ADD_CREG (c_rd,c_rs,c_rt) UnsignedAddition (Cout , c_rd) ← c_rs +c_rt + Cin
SUB_CREG (c_rd,c_rs,c_rt) UnsignedSubtraction (Bout , c_rd) ← c_rs -c_rt - Bin
COMP_CREG
(c_rd,c_rs,c_rt) Comparison c_rd = c_rs > c_rt ?1 : 0
SHL_CREG (c_rs ,c_rt) Shift togetherleft c_rs ← c_rs[126:0] ||c_rt[127]
SHR_CREG (c_rs ,c_rt) Shift togetherright c_rs ← c_rt[0] ||c_rt[127:1]
MUL_CREG (c_rs,c_rt) UnsignedMultiplication (HI / LO) ← c_rs ×c_rt
LOAD_CREG (c_rd) Load data frommemory c_rd ← Memory[address]
STORE_CREG (c_rd) Store data tomemory Memory [address] ←c_rd
Table 2: List of Instructions
2.6 Total Hardware Cost
Introducing the CU to base processor increases the total area. The hardware
costs of the units inside the CU are given in terms of gates in 0.13µm CMOS
technology (c.f. Table 3 and 4) for both 5 and 7 stage pipeline versions of base
processor. Cost of the CRF includes number of gates for 32×128 bit register
file. Multiply unit’s cost includes four 32-bit multipliers and four 128-bit
registers which store the partial products during a 128-bit multiplication.
While cost of the IU includes 128-bit adder and comparator circuit. The
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rest of additional hardware cost including multiplexing and decoding circuit
given under Other costs part in Tables 3 and 4.
Unit Gate Count
base processor 118,475
CRF 46,631
Multiply Unit 42,471
IU 5,113
Shifter 35
Other 15,576
CU 109,946
Table 3: Hardware Cost of CU (5 stage pipeline)
Unit Gate Count
base processor 136,829
CRF 48,452
Multiply Unit 46,236
IU 5,122
Shifter 35
Other 15,929
CU total 115,774
Table 4: Hardware Cost of CU (7 stage pipeline)
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3 Modular Multiplication
3.1 Montgomery Multiplication
The Montgomery multiplication for fast computation of modular multiplica-
tion of big integers is proposed by P.L. Montgomery [22]. The Montgomery
Multiplication algorithm (MM ) computes the following:
MM(X, Y,N) = X · Y ·R−1 mod N (1)
where X and Y are the multiplicand and multiplier respectively, N is the
modulus and R is an integer with the property gcd(N,R) = 1. One can
choose any R however if R is chosen as power of 2 (e.g. 2k) then the imple-
mentation of Montgomery multiplication on microprocessors turns out to be
very fast. While calculating
X · Y mod N
requires trial division by N, Montgomery multiplication only needs division
by a power of two, R = 2k, which can be performed by shifting result k times
to right and shift operation is executed very fast in microprocessors and also
comes with a low cost in software and free in hardware.
Prior to performing Montgomery multiplication, all operands need to be
translated to their N-residue representation. N-residue of an integer a is
denoted as
aR = a ·R mod N
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where R = 2k. The set of {a ·R mod N | 0 ≤ a ≤ n− 1} is a complete
residue system and includes all numbers between [0, p − 1]. The numbers
in the range [0, p − 1] have a one-to-one correspondence with residue set
given above. Montgomery Multiplication employs the property of the residue
system above and computes the N-residue product of two N-residue integers
efficiently. Montgomery Multiplication consists of two steps as described in
Algorithm 2. First multiplication of two residue numbers is calculated and
then product is reduced to its final form. For the reduction step an additional
quantity, N ′, is defined with the following property
R ·R−1 −N ·N ′ = 1
where both N ′ and R−1 can be calculated by using extended Euclidean al-
gorithm.
Algorithm 2 Montgomery Multiplication
1: T = aR · bR
2: U = (T + (T ·N ′ mod R) ·N)/R
3: if U ≥ N then return U −N else return U
The step 2 of Montgomery Multiplication algorithm involves modulo R
and division by R operations. These operations are executed very fast in
microprocessors since division by R = 2k means just shifting result right by
k times and modulo R operation is performed by taking only lower k bits of
product and discarding the rest.
The flow of operations for performing the Montgomery Multiplication
given in Equation 1 are defined as follows
• Conversion of X to N-residue form
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XR = MM(X,R
2, N) = X ·R2 ·R−1 = X ·R mod N
• Conversion of Y to N-residue form
YR = MM(Y,R
2, N) = Y ·R2 ·R−1 = Y ·R mod N
• Computation of product in N-residue form
PR = MM(XR, YR, N) = XR.YR.R
−1 mod N
PR = X ·R · Y ·R ·R−1 = X · Y mod N
• Conversion of the product from its N-residue form
P = MM(PR, 1, N) = X.Y.R.1.R
−1 = X.Y mod N
To perform one Modular multiplication with Montgomery algorithm, four
multiplications have to be calculated. Also for reduction an extra effort is
made to compute value of N ′. Therefore using Montgomery Multiplication
for single modular multiplication is not feasible. Montgomery Multiplication
become efficient when several modular multiplications have to be performed
as in the case of modular exponentiation. In this case, the N-residue rep-
resentation of intermediate results can be maintained while only conversion
operation is needed during first and last multiplication.
3.1.1 Methods for Montgomery Multiplication
An overview of five different algorithms for Montgomery Multiplication is
provided by Koç et al. [19]. Organization of these algorithms is based on
two facts:
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• whether multiplication and reduction steps during Montgomery Multi-
plication are separated or integrated,
• form of the multiplication and reduction steps.
In this section we will highlight two of these algorithms: Separated Operand
Scanning (SOS) and Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS). While
all algorithms in [19] require same number of word-level multiplications, the
number of additions, memory read and write operations differ in each. The
CIOS method is the most efficient and fastest method when implemented on
general purpose microprocessors, since it has the least amount of memory
space with s+3 words, where s is the number of words in one operand, and
requires less addition, read and write operations. However, a modified version
of SOS method is implemented for cryptographically-enhanced processor and
the reasons for choosing the SOS method is analyzed in Section 3.1.4.
3.1.2 The Separated Operand Scanning (SOS) Method
The SOS Method (cf. Algorithm 3) consists of two separate steps: multi-
plication and reduction. First multiplication of two integers is performed
and then product is reduced to its final form. Because the outer loop moves
through words of one of the operands during the execution of algorithm, the
method is called as operand scanning [19].
The first part of the algorithm is a school-book multiplication which com-
putes 2s word size product and stores in t where s is the number of words in
the operands. Then value of u is then computed as follows according to the
second step in Algorithm 2
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u = (t+m · n)/r
where m = t · n′ mod r. First u is taken as u = t, then m · n is added to u
and finally u is divided by r, which is simply shifting u to right or ignoring
lower words of u [19]. The ADD function in the method performs the carry
propagation operation. Since carry can propagate to the last word, one bit
carry may be generated at the end and this carry should be stored. Storing
the final carry increases the size of t by one word and size of t becomes 2s+1
words. Finally value of u is stored in s + 1 words and if the value of u is
greater than the modulus, u is subtracted from modulus and final value of
multiplication is found.
The analysis in [19] demonstrates that during the SOS method, following
number of operations have to be performed
• 2s2 + 2 multiplications
• 4s2 + 4s+ 2 additions
• 6s2 + 7s+ 3 reads
• 2s2 + 6s+ 2 writes
Furthermore, it is noted that the SOS Method requires a total of 2s+2 words
for temporary results. 2s + 1 of these words is used for storing t and one
word is used for storing the value of m.
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Algorithm 3 Separated Operand Scanning (SOS) Method
Input: a, b, n multi-word integers (w bits in each word),
s: number of words in the operands and modulus
Output: t: multi-word product
1. for i = 0 to s− 1
2. C = 0
3. for j = 0 to s− 1
4. (C, S) = t[i+ j] + a[j] · b[i] + C
5. t[i+ j] = S
6. t[i+ s] = C
7. for i = 0 to s− 1
8. C = 0
9. m = t[i] · n′ [0] mod 2w
10. for j = 0 to s− 1
11. (C, S) = t[i+ j] +m · n[j] + C
12. t[i+ j] = S
13. ADD(t[i+ s], C)
14. for j = 0 to s
15. u[j] = t[j + s]
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3.1.3 The Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) Method
CIOS method (cf. Algorithm 4) differs from the SOS method in a way
that the CIOS integrates both multiplication and reduction steps. Instead
of computing entire multiplication, the CIOS method alternates during the
iterations of the outer loops of multiplication and reduction. Integration
of multiplication and reduction is possible since the value of m during the
ith iteration of the outer loop for reduction depends only on the value of
t[i] and this value is already computed by ith iteration of the outer loop for
multiplication [19].
The analysis in [19] reveals the number operations executed while per-
forming modular multiplication with the CIOS method are as follows
• 2s2 + s multiplications
• 4s2 + 4s+ 2 additions
• 6s2 + 7s+ 2 reads
• 2s2 + 5s+ 1 writes
Moreover, it is shown in [19] that the CIOS method reduces memory usage
significantly when compared to the SOS method. The SOS method uses 2s+2
words for storage of temporary results while the CIOS method requires only
s + 3 words where s + 2 words are used to store t and one word is used for
storing m.
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Algorithm 4 Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) method
Input: a, b, n multi-word integers (w bits in each word),
s: number of words in the operands and modulus
Output: t: multi-word product
1. for i = 0 to s− 1
2. C = 0
3. for j = 0 to s− 1
4. (C, S) = t[i+ j] + a[j] · b[i] + C
5. t[j] = S
6. (C, S) = t[s] + C
7. t[s] = S
8. t[s+ 1] = C
9. C = 0
10. m = t[i] · n′ [0] mod 2w
11. for j = 0 to s− 1
12. (C, S) = t[i+ j] +m · n[j] + C
13. t[j] = S
14. (C, S) = t[s] + C
15. t[s] = S
16. t[s+ 1] = t[s+ 1] + C
17. for j = 0 to s
18. t[j] = t[j + 1]
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3.1.4 Enhanced SOS Method
Fastest and most efficient Montgomery multiplication on a general-purpose
processor can be implemented by using the CIOS method according to the
analysis provided in [19]. However, in cryptographically-enhanced processor,
cryptographic operations are executed in the proposed CEU which is differ-
ent than execution units of general purpose computers. The CEU requires
that all operands should be stored in the CRF, therefore a new analysis
should be performed for the CIOS and SOS methods
The SOS method separates the multiplication and reduction operations
and first performs the multiplication and then reduction. For the worst case,
which is performing 1024-bit modular multiplication in RSA, all operands
and the product can fit into the CRF after the multiplication step since the
CRF has a total size of 512 Bytes. For the reduction step modulus and m
value should be stored in the CRF and these values can be written over the
operands since after multiplication step, operands are not used anymore (cf.
Algorithm 3).
However, the CIOS method integrates both multiplication and reduc-
tion step and executes them interleaved. Therefore all operands, product,
modulus and m as well should be stored during the execution of the CIOS
method (cf. Algorithm 4). Storing all these values require 544 Bytes of
space which is larger than the size of CRF. For this reason, a modified ver-
sion of SOS method is implemented for performing modular multiplications
on cryptographically-enhanced processor.
The Enhanced SOS Method is presented in Algorithm 5. In the enhanced
method all multiplications are computed as 128-bit multiplications and the
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product is stored in HI and LO registers. Therefore for the addition opera-
tions HI and LO registers are used.
Algorithm 5 Enhanced SOS Method
Input: a, b, n multi-word integers (w bits in each word),
s: number of words in the operands and modulus
Output: t: multi-word product
1. for i = 0 to s− 1
2. C = 0
3. for j = 0 to s− 1
4. (C, S) = t[i+ j] + LO + C (a[j] · b[i]→ HI ||LO)
5. t[i+ j] = LO
6. C = HI + Carry
7. t[i+ s] = C
8. for i = 0 to s− 1
9. C = 0
10. m = t[i] · n′ [0] mod 2w
11. for j = 0 to s− 1
12. (C, S) = t[i+ j] + LO + C (m · n[j]→ HI ||LO)
13. t[i+ j] = LO
14. ADD(t[i+ s], C)
15. for j = 0 to s
16. u[j] = t[j + s]
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3.1.5 Performance Analysis
In this section performance analysis of the CIOS and the SOS method is
provided. Modular Multiplication is heavily performed both in RSA and
elliptic curve cryptography, therefore operand sizes are chosen according to
the security levels of both algorithms. Typical unbreakable and secure RSA
key length is 1024-bits and the same level of security for the elliptic curve
cryptography can be achieved by using 160-bit key length . Therefore, in the
performance analysis operand sizes are chosen starting from 160-bit and up
to 1024-bits.
Performance of the CIOS method is tested on base processor since in [19]
it is suggested that the CIOS method is the most efficient method for hard-
ware implementation and processors. The performance of the SOS method
is tested on cryptographically-enhanced processor to utilize the proposed en-
hancements. Performance of both algorithms in clock cycles and speedup
values for modular multiplication is presented in Table 5 and 6. Table 5 pro-
vides the speedup values for 5 stage pipeline versions of base processor and
cryptographically-enhanced processor and Table 6 provides speedup values
for 7 stage pipeline versions of both processors.
Note that execution time of 160 and 192-bit multiplications in the SOS
method is greater than the execution time of 256-bits. The reason for this
deviation is due to the width of registers in the CRF. Since the CRF has 128-
bit width, after multiplication step in the SOS, 160 and 192-bit multiplication
results have to aligned before reduction which increases the execution time.
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Precision CIOS SOS Speedup
160 2,765 1,047 2.6
192 3,873 1,196 3.2
256 6,691 931 7.2
512 25,605 2,365 10.8
1024 100,304 7,654 13.1
Table 5: Speedups for Modular Multiplication on 5-stage pipeline version
Precision CIOS SOS Speedup
160 3,032 1,132 2.7
192 3,747 1,282 2.9
256 7,310 1,013 7.2
512 27,856 2,598 10.7
1024 108,493 8,418 12.9
Table 6: Speedups for Modular Multiplication on 7-stage pipeline version
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4 Modular Inversion
4.1 Modular Inversion in finite GF (p)
Basic modular arithmetic operations such as addition, multiplication and in-
version have significant importance on numerous cryptographic systems. The
RSA algorithm [25], Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [8], US Govern-
ment Digital Signal Standard [23] and Elliptic Curve Cryptography [18, 20]
are some examples in which modular arithmetic operations are heavily per-
formed.
Modular inversion operation is crucial in public key cryptography since
it is used for accelerating the so-called addition-subtraction chains [10, 16]
and computing point operations on an elliptic curve defined over finite field
GF (p)[18, 20] .
In elliptic curve cryptography when affine coordinates are used, inversion
in GF (p) becomes the most time consuming operation. Projective coordi-
nates can be used yet one inversion is still necessary for conversion of the
result to a desired representation. Even a single inversion operation brings a
significant overhead on a general-purpose processor.
Modular inverse of an integer a  [1, p − 1] in GF (p) is denoted as the
integer x  [1, p− 1] which has the following property:
a · x = 1 mod p
The most common and one of the best ways to compute modular inverse
in finite fields is the binary extended Euclidean Algorithm[16]. However, for
the hardware implementation, most efficient inversion algorithms are Kaliski
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[15] and its variation Montgomery Inversion algorithms [26].
4.1.1 Kaliski and Montgomery Inversion Algorithm
The modular inverse of an integer, a, is redefined by Kaliski in his work [15].
Kaliski inversion algorithm computes modular inverse of an integer by using
the principles of the Montgomery arithmetic introduced by [22]. The Kaliski
inverse of the integer (cf. Algorithm 6) is defined in residue domain and
compatible with the Montgomery arithmetic and given as follows:
KaliskiInv(a) = a
−12n mod p
where p is a prime number and n is the number of bits in prime p (i.e. n =
dlog2pe) .
Kaliski inversion algorithm consists of two phases. Phase I calculates the
integer r such that
r = a−12k mod p
where n ≤ k ≤ 2n. Phase II is merely a correction step and computes the
integer x which is the inverse of a in the residue domain
x = a−12n mod p
The number of iterations in Phase II is entirely dependent on k, which is
found to be about 1.4n where n is the length of the modulus in bits. The
k value is appropriate according to the analysis performed in [16] for the
number of halving in the binary extended Euclidean algorithm.
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Montgomery Inversion algorithm [26] is similar to the Kaliski Inversion
algorithm. Phase I steps are exactly the same for two algorithms. The
difference between two algorithms is the output value at the end of Phase II.
Modular inverse of the integer a in the Kaliski inversion is computed as
x = KaliskiInv(a) = a
−12n mod p
while in the Montgomery inversion the inverse value of a is computed as
x = MontgomeryInv(a) = a
−122n mod p
The Kaliski algorithm is suitable for calculating inverse of a number rep-
resented in integer domain since inverse of an integer a is computed as
x = KaliskiInv(a) = a
−12n mod p
However, if the input of the Kaliski inversion algorithm is given in the residue
domain, a2n, then inverse of the number in residue form is computed as
x = KaliskiInv(a2
n) = a−1 mod p
which is in the integer domain.
In order to have fast elliptic curve operations, operations are performed
using the Montgomery arithmetic thus numbers should be represented in the
residue domain. If one uses the Kaliski inversion for a number represented in
the residue domain, some extra arithmetic operations are needed to convert
result from integer to the residue domain. Instead, the Montgomery inversion
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(cf. Algorithm 7) can be used for the numbers represented in residue domain.
In Montgomery Inversion, the inverse of a number in residue domain, a2n, is
represented as
x = MontgomeryInv(a2
n) = a−12n mod p
which is also in the residue domain.
Both algorithms can be used interchangeably to compute inverse in residue
domain. Kaliski Inversion can be used to compute inverse of a number repre-
sented in integer domain, while Montgomery Inversion can be employed for
computing inverse of numbers in residue domain.
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Algorithm 6 Kaliski Inversion Algorithm
Phase I
Input: a  [p− 1] and prime p
Output: r  [p− 1] and k, where r = a−12k mod p and n ≤ k ≤ 2n
1. u = p, v = a, r = 0 ,s = 1 and k = 1
2. while (v > 0)
3. if u is even then u = u/2, s = 2s
4. else if v is even then v = v/2, r = r/2
5. else if u > v then u = (u− v)/2, r = r + s, s = 2s
6. else v = (v − u)/2, s = s+ r, r = 2r
7. k = k + 1
8. if r ≥ p then r = r − p mod p
9. return r = p− r and k
Phase II
Input : r  [1, p− 1], p and k
Output : x  [1, p− 1], where x = a−12n mod p
1. for i = 0 to k − n
2. if r is even then r = r/2
3. else r = (r + p)/2
4. return x = r
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Algorithm 7 Montgomery Inversion Algorithm
Phase I
Input: a  [p− 1] and prime p
Output: r  [p− 1] and k, where r = a−12k mod p and n ≤ k ≤ 2n
1. u = p, v = a, r = 0 ,s = 1 and k = 1
2. while (v > 0)
3. if u is even then u = u/2, s = 2s
4. else if v is even then v = v/2, r = r/2
5. else if u > v then u = (u− v)/2, r = r + s, s = 2s
6. else v = (v − u)/2, s = s+ r, r = 2r
7. k = k + 1
8. if r ≥ p then r = r − p mod p
9. return r = p− r and k
Phase II
Input : r  [1, p− 1], p and k
Output : x  [1, p− 1], where x = a−122n mod p
1. for i = 0 to 2n− k
2. r = 2r
3. if (r ≥ p) then r = r − p
4. return x = r
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4.1.2 Implementation Details
The most time consuming operations performed during Kaliski and Mont-
gomery inversion are multi-precision addition,subtraction, division and mul-
tiplication by 2 operations, which can also be observed in Algorithm 3 and 4.
The IU inside the CEU is designed to increase the performance of these op-
erations. Addition and subtraction operation is performed by 128-bit adder
circuit. Multiplication and division by 2 are implemented as shift left and
shift right operations on microprocessors. However, shift operations in the
cryptographically-enhanced processor slightly differs from the traditional pro-
cessors. Shift operations are performed on the values loaded from the CRF
and the CRF has two read ports but only one write port. Hence shift oper-
ations are performed as shifting boundary bits (i.e. least or most significant
bits) from one register to another while only one of the registers changes (cf.
Table 2).
4.1.3 Performance Analysis
In this section execution times of Kaliski and Montgomery Inversion algo-
rithms on base processor and cryptographically-enhanced processor are pro-
vided in terms of clock cycles. Cycle times are taken from both 5 and 7 stage
pipeline versions of the processors and presented in the tables below. The first
values in the tables represent the execution time on 5 stage pipeline version
of given processor while second values denote the execution time on 7 stage
pipeline version. Tables 7 and 9 demonstrate the execution time of Mont-
gomery and Kaliski Inversion operation on the base processor respectively.
Execution time for the same algorithms on the cryptographically-enhanced
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processor are given in Tables 8 and 10. Finally speed-up values for both
Montgomery and Kaliski Inversion operations are given in Tables 11 and 12.
Precision Phase I Phase II Total
160 63,855 / 77,168 14,319 / 16,848 78,174 / 94,016
192 86,300 / 104,400 19,782 / 22,896 106,082 / 127,296
256 140,624 / 170,424 31,783 / 37,515 172,407 / 207,939
512 468,936 / 566,448 110,942 / 131,656 579,878 / 698,104
Table 7: Montgomery Inversion on base processor
Precision Phase I Phase II Total
160 29,153 / 32,012 7,825 / 8,777 36,978 / 40,789
192 34,706 / 38,185 9,158 / 10,300 43,864 / 48,485
256 45,552 / 50,259 11,616 / 13,095 57,168 / 63,354
512 114,447 / 123,942 27,389 / 29,879 141,836 / 153,821
Table 8: Montgomery Inversion on cryptographically-enhanced processor
Precision Phase I Phase II Total
160 63,906 / 77,041 8,504 / 9,832 72,410 / 86,873
192 86,313 / 104,135 11,432 / 13,369 97,745 / 117,504
256 141,075 / 170,311 18,573 / 22,100 159,648 / 192,411
512 473,306 / 570,196 59,594 / 70,340 532,900 / 640,536
Table 9: Kaliski Inversion on base processor
Precision Phase I Phase II Total cycles
160 29,560 / 32,318 3,374 / 3,679 32,934 / 35,997
192 35,103 / 38,463 3,894 / 4,281 38,997 / 42,744
256 45,961 / 50,483 4,779 / 5,089 50,740 / 55,572
512 116,814 / 126,613 11,198 / 11,939 128,012 / 138,552
Table 10: Kaliski Inversion on cryptographically-enhanced processor
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Precision Phase I Phase II Total
160 2.19 / 2.41 1.83 / 1.92 2.11 / 2.30
192 2.49 / 2.73 2.16 / 2.22 2.42 / 2.63
256 3.09 / 3.39 2.74 / 2.86 3.02 / 3.28
512 4.10 / 4.57 4.05 / 4.41 4.09 / 4.54
Table 11: Montgomery Inversion Speedups
Precision Phase I Phase II Total
160 2.16 / 2.38 2.52 / 2.67 2.20 / 2.41
192 2.46 / 2.71 2.94 / 3.12 2.51 / 2.75
256 3.07 / 3.37 3.89 / 4.34 3.15 / 3.46
512 4.05 / 4.50 5.32 / 5.89 4.16 / 4.62
Table 12: Kaliski Inversion Speedups
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5 Implementation Details
In this section, we provide the speedup values obtained for both RSA and
elliptic curve cryptography by using the proposed enhancements in Chapters
3 and 4. Also we will demonstrate time × area metric for RSA and elliptic
curve cryptography the cryptographically-enhanced processor synthesized on
Avnet LX200 FPGA board.
We implement a simple 1024-bit RSA using two methods: windowing
method with 4-bit window size and no windowing. On the base processor,
1024-bit RSA with 4-bit windows takes on average 132, 361, 636 clock cycles.
The profile of the operation reveals that 97.48% of execution time is spent
on modular multiplication. Consequently, the speedup obtained by running
same operation on the cryptographically-enhanced processor is 11.26. 1024-
bit RSA with no windowing method takes 156, 812, 860 clock cycles on base
processor, 97.86% of which is spent on modular multiplication according to
the profile information. The speedup for this case is found out to be 11.47.
Similarly, we implemented elliptic curve scalar point multiplication with
jacobian coordinates [6] and the implementation results are given in Table
13.
Precision base processor enhanced processor % of Multiplication Speedup
160 5,684,844 2,695,097 87 2.11
192 9,774,069 3,673,000 90.17 2.66
256 21,509,576 4,412,633 92.49 4.87
512 160,109,439 19,798,812 96.51 8.08
Table 13: Implementation Results for Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication
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It is a common tendency to think that there is no need to speedup inver-
sion operation due to projective coordinates (e.g. jacobian coordinates) [6].
Projective coordinates eliminate all but one inversion from elliptic curve point
operations at the expense of more multiplications; only inversion operation is
needed for converting from projective coordinates to affine coordinates. We
demonstrate, in this section, that the time spent on one inversion might be
significant especially when the modular multiplication is performed on our en-
hanced processor. Using projective coordinates, one elliptic curve scalar point
multiplication takes approximately 2, 695, 097 clock cycles for 160-bit elliptic
curve on the enhanced processor. Our implementation of Montgomery inver-
sion for 160-bit operands would consume, on the other hand, 76, 692 clock
cycles if the ISA is not utilized. The inversion, therefore, consumes only
about 2.8% of all clock cycles spent on scalar point multiplication including
conversion. This does not call for a strong need to speedup the inversion
operation since any improvement on inversion will marginally speedup the
entire point operation. There are, however, pre-computation techniques that
significantly improve the elliptic curve point operations. For example, with
fixed-base comb method it is possible to perform one scalar point multipli-
cation in expectedly 342, 901 clock cycles on the enhanced processor. This
time, the inversion operation would consume about 22.36% of clock cycles
without the CU ; which is a good motivation for speeding up inversion op-
eration. Consequently, this would be translated into 11.78% speedup in one
point multiplication due to the improvement in inversion calculations.
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5.1 FPGA Emulation and Time-Area Metrics
Tensilica supports implementation of LX2 cores on both ASIC’s and FPGA
boards. Since ASIC implementation of the cryptographically-enhanced pro-
cessor is costly and time consuming process, the cryptographically-enhanced
processor is synthesized on FPGA boards. Tensilica supports only Avnet
LX60 and Avnet LX200 boards for implementation of LX2 processor cores.
Among two boards, Avnet LX200 board is chosen for the realization of
cryptographically-enhanced processor due to its high flexibility and greater
number of slices.
Implementation of the cryptographically-enhanced processor on Avnet LX200
board is as follows: first configuration of the cryptographically-enhanced pro-
cessor with TIE files attached to processor, which defines the architecture
extensions, are sent to Tensilica Xtensa Processor Generator (XPG) server.
XPG generates and supplies precompiled bitstreams for Avnet LX200 boards.
Prior to sending the cryptographically-enhanced processor to XPG, target
frequency is set to 50 MHz, which is the largest target frequency for Avnet
LX200 boards. Both the base processor and the cryptographically-enhanced
processor is sent to XPG. According to the bitstreams, the frequency of the
base processor is 50.6 MHz while frequency of the cryptographically-enhanced
processor is 50.3 MHz. Furthermore, the base processor occupies 18, 224
slices on Avnet LX200 boards and the cryptographically-enhanced processor
occupies 31, 530 slices on the same FPGA board. These results show that ar-
chitectural enhancements increase the core size without affecting the critical
path delay.
By utilizing the information obtained from the bitstreams of both proces-
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sors, time×area metric for RSA and elliptic curve scalar point multiplication
is presented in tables below. Table 14 presents the time × area product of
RSA for both no windowing and 4-bit windowing options. The product val-
ues are normalized to the 4-bit windowing implementation of RSA on the
cryptographically-enhanced processor.
Core Operation Area (Slices) Clock Cycles Time × Area
Base RSA (4-bit w.) 18,224 132,361,636 6.50
Enhanced RSA (4-bit w.) 31,530 11,753,299 1.0
Base RSA (no w.) 18,224 156,812,860 7.71
Enhanced RSA (no w.) 31,530 13,642,547 1.16
Table 14: Time× Area product for RSA
Table 15 provides the time × area product values of point multiplica-
tion operations for elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Note that, the prod-
uct values are normalized to the 160-bit point multiplication operation on
cryptographically-enhanced processor.
Core Operation Area (Slices) Clock Cycles Time × Area
Base 160-bit ECC 18,224 5,684,844 1.22
Base 192-bit ECC 18,224 9,774,069 2.10
Base 256-bit ECC 18,224 21,509,576 4.61
Base 512-bit ECC 18,224 160,109,439 34.34
Enhanced 160-bit ECC 31,530 2,695,097 1.00
Enhanced 192-bit ECC 31,530 3,673,000 1.36
Enhanced 256-bit ECC 31,530 4,412,633 1.64
Enhanced 512-bit ECC 31,530 19,748,196 7.33
Table 15: Time× Area for ECC
Finally, Table 16 presents the performance improvement of RSA and ECC
point multiplication operation.
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Operation Improvement
RSA (4-bit w.) 6.51
RSA (no w.) 6.64
160-bit ECC 1.22
192-bit ECC 1.54
256-bit ECC 2.82
512-bit ECC 4.69
Table 16: Improvements for RSA and ECC
58
6 An AES Implementation Hardened Against
Cache Attacks
Efficient software implementations of many symmetric key ciphers are vul-
nerable to cache attacks since they usually utilize look up tables for nonlinear
function (s-box) calculations, where these look up tables generally fit in the
first or second-level caches of the modern processors. The most efficient AES
implementation in software is due to Barreto [4] where four 1 KB tables are
used for the first nine round of 128-bit AES. Another table of the same size
(can actually be made smaller, i.e. 256 B) is used in the last round. Many
cache-based attacks [1, 2, 7] exploit access patterns of cryptographic process
to cache lines, which may contain the desired data value (cache hit), or not
(cache miss). Considering the fact that a cache miss introduces a significant
(and observable) delay to the computation due to the fact that cache mem-
ory is much faster than the main memory, the discrepancies in the execution
time of different runs of AES leak information on the secret (or round) keys.
For a formal model of cache attacks, one can profitably refer to [5, 24].
Most powerful attacks focus either on the first round of AES as in [24] and
on the last round as in [1] since these rounds directly interact with outside
world by taking the plaintext and outputting the ciphertext, both of which
are easily observable by an adversary. Therefore, it is of utmost importance
to protect the first and last rounds. Implementing even one round without
using any look up tables (in order not to leave any trace in the cache) can
be painfully slow in software due to involved bit manipulation operations.
A fast AES implementation secure against cache attacks may have to use a
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combination of the techniques proposed in [5, 24]. Our proposed architecture
can be beneficial in applying these protection mechanisms. For example, the
aforementioned CRF can be used to store a part of the s-box since its limited
size does not lend itself to accommodate all look up tables, which are 5 KB
in total size. 256 bytes of the CRF can only hold up precomputed values for
byte substitution layer of one AES round. Since lookups in this table result
in accesses to the register file, which returns the requested byte in constant
time, there will be no timing differences. Furthermore, the fact that the CRF
is not time shared (at least while cryptographic process has locked it), other
(possibly spy) processes cannot observe the trace left by the cryptographic
process.
A small look up table, specifically placed for AES implementation and
organized for a fast access enables that any round of the AES can be securely
implemented without any significant overhead in timing when compared to
the implementation in [4]. However, our design principle is to recycle versatile
cryptographic units to benefit various cryptographic operations. Since the
timing requirements for public key algorithms is more demanding, we elect
to organize the CRF as one-dimensional array of 32 elements of 128 bit each.
The drawback of this approach is some overhead in accessing the desired
bytes in the register file. One can, all the same, always arrange the CRF as
byte array if symmetric cipher performance is more important.
We modified the implementation in [4] by replacing the rounds with their
secure counterparts, and listed the overhead (in number of clock cycles)
roundwise in Table 17 for a single block encryption of 128 bits.
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[4] 1st last 1st + last per round
796 171(21.5%) 33(4.5%) 199(25%) 178(≈ 22.4%)
Table 17: Overhead of protecting rounds of AES in number of clock cycles
To give an idea as to how expensive is to protect even one round of AES,
we also implemented an AES version without any look up table in software
optimized for speed; the resulting overhead of protecting only the first round
of AES turns out to be 36, 125 clock cycles.
As explained in [5] for standard implementation, a small table can be used
to protect the rounds of AES. We also implemented the standard method for
different rounds and found out that protecting one round brings about the
overhead of approximately 29%, which is higher than our . Consequently, the
standard implementation whose all rounds are protected takes about 2654
clock cycles, while our fully-protected implementation on the enhanced core
takes about 2, 246. This translates into 16% improvement over the standard
implementation. Note that the standard implementation may be still vulner-
able to synchronized attacks through a spy process that can evict cache lines
during the AES computation. On the other hand, our AES implementation
provides perfect security against cache attacks and costs almost no overhead
in hardware since we utilize the cryptographic unit which is already included
for public key operations.
The case study of AES confirms our claim as to the necessity of a cryp-
tographic register file that can be used for multiple purposes, e.g. speeding
up the cryptographic operations, storing sensitive key elements, and secure
implementation of non-linear functions (s-boxes).
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
We designed and implemented a cryptographic unit (CU ), for secure and fast
execution of a wide range of cryptographic algorithms. The proposed CU
introduces new functional units and instructions for performing faster multi-
precision arithmetic operations on finite fields. To show the design’s efficiency
and applicability, we integrated the proposed CU into the execution pipeline
of a low cost, configurable and extensible embedded processor core. We ob-
tained considerable speedups for basic multi-precision arithmetic operations
such as modular multiplication and inversion in GF (p) finite field, which
are the dominant operations in many public key cryptosystems. Impact of
the speedups are demonstrated for scalar point multiplication operation of
elliptic curve cryptography and RSA. Up to 8 and 10 times of performance
improvements are achieved respectively for these public key cryptosystems.
We synthesized the extended processor core on a specific FPGA board
to observe hardware cost of the CU. Synthesis results reveal a conservative
hardware cost for the CU. However, additional hardware does not result a
significant increase in critical path delay. Time× area product of RSA and
elliptic curve cryptography shows a performance enhancement up to 6 and 4
times respectively. A comparison of the obtained speedup values and incurred
hardware overhead clearly confirms that the benefits of the CU far exceed
its cost. Furthermore, we showed that CU can be used to harden software
implementations of symmetric-key ciphers with low overhead against certain
side-channel attacks (i.e. cache attacks).
We leave the actual implementation of the enhanced embedded proces-
sor on ASIC’s as a future work. Higher frequency values can be achieved
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on ASIC implementations. Throughout the design process of CU, all the
enhancements introduced are designed in such a way that they do not have
significantly adverse effect on the critical path of the base processor. For
instance, the critical path of a 128-bit multiplier consists of four 32-bit mul-
tipliers that work in parallel to each other. We applied the same approach
for the other functional units in the CU. There will be, however, definitely an
associated penalty in the maximum applicable frequency in ASIC implemen-
tation due to the increase in the total chip area. Limited reduction in clock
frequency would not be a major problem for embedded applications where
relatively low clock frequencies are adopted. Exploring the (possibly nega-
tive) effect of the CU on the maximum applicable frequency and optimizing
the functional units to minimize this effect is left as a future work.
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